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Medial prefrontal dissociations during
processing of trait diagnostic and
nondiagnostic person information
Jason P. Mitchell,1 Jasmin Cloutier,2 Mahzarin R. Banaji,1 and C. Neil Macrae3
1

Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, and 2Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA, and 3School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
Previous research has suggested that perceivers spontaneously extract trait-specific information from the behaviour of others.
However, little is known about whether perceivers spontaneously engage in the same depth of social-cognitive processing for all
person information or reserve such processing specifically for information that conveys diagnostic clues about another person’s
dispositions. Moreover, a question remains as to whether the processing of such nondiagnostic information can be affected by
perceivers’ explicit goal to consider another’s dispositions or not. To examine processing of diagnostic and nondiagnostic social
information as a function of perceivers’ explicit social-cognitive goals, participants underwent functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) scanning while performing social (impression formation) or non-social orienting tasks using statements that
conveyed either diagnostic or nondiagnostic information about the target’s personality traits. Replicating two earlier studies,
results identified a region of dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) that was preferentially activated by impression formation.
Interestingly, no difference between trait-diagnostic and nondiagnostic information was observed when participants had the
explicit goal of forming an impression, but a substantial effect of diagnosticity emerged when task instructions oriented them
away from considering the target as a social agent. These results suggest that trait-nondiagnostic information is not subject to
spontaneous social-cognitive processing, but that such processing may nevertheless occur when perceivers have the explicit goal
to use that information to form an impression of a target.

Recent research has consistently observed a distinct set of
brain regions that preferentially activates during socialcognitive tasks that require thinking of another as a social
agent. These regions—which include areas of the medial
frontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporal
poles and lateral parietal cortex (such as temporal–parietal
junction)—have been implicated in a wide range of tasks
that require participants to infer the mental states of others,
such as understanding stories that require reference to
another’s beliefs (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005) or
feelings (Mitchell et al., 2005); speculating about another’s
knowledge (Goel et al., 1995) and competing or cooperating
with a person in a computerized game (McCabe et al., 2001;
Gallagher et al., 2002). For recent reviews, see Gallagher and
Frith (2003) and Blakemore et al. (2004).
Recently, we reported a similar dissociation in dorsal
aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) when
perceivers considered less transient aspects of another
person’s mind, namely, their dispositional traits.
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Across two studies (Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005), we observed
greater activation in dorsal mPFC when participants used
experimentally provided statements to form an impression
of a person (i.e. an inherently social judgement) than when
they attended to the sequence in which statements were
being presented (i.e. a relatively less social judgement).
Importantly, this effect was obtained only when participants
engaged in the social act of considering another’s personality
and does not extend to attempts to form impressions of
inanimate objects (Mitchell et al., 2005).
In these earlier studies, stimulus statements described
actions that were inherently diagnostic clues to a target’s
personality (e.g. ‘he played his music loud at the public
picnic grounds’; ‘he finished the New York Times crossword
puzzle in only 10 minutes’; ‘he went out of his way to meet
someone of a different background’). Using exactly these
kinds of stimuli, researchers have repeatedly demonstrated
that perceivers make spontaneous and unintended use of
such diagnostic information to infer the dispositional traits
of others (for reviews, see Uleman et al., 1996, 2005). For
example, after reading that John played his music loud in
public, perceivers spontaneously infer that John is inconsiderate. Moreover, such spontaneous trait inferences seem
to occur under a range of conditions in which perceivers are
not explicitly oriented towards trying to understand the
mind of another person (Uleman and Moskowitz, 1994;
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Todorov and Uleman, 2003). In other words, perceivers need
not expressly intend to make meaning of another’s internal
mental states for the automatic inference of traits to occur.
However, many of the actions performed by a person in
everyday life do not as readily communicate diagnostic
information about his or her personality. Most often, we
encounter people engaging in far more mundane behaviours:
someone getting on the subway, ordering a cup of coffee at
Starbucks, depositing a check at an ATM, etc. Relatively little
is known about the kind of social processing perceivers
perform when they come into contact with such everyday
actions. Do perceivers spontaneously attempt to glean
meaning from even such trait-impoverished behaviours as
someone attempting to hail a cab or waiting for the walk
signal at a busy intersection? Or does deep consideration of
such mundane behaviours require particular processing
goals, such as intentional, conscious attempts to form an
impression of a target?
These questions have been notoriously difficult to address
using established experimental paradigms. In large part, this
difficulty arises because the evidence that perceivers
spontaneously process information about a target deeply
enough to infer his or her traits has typically come from
demonstrations that perceivers later make use of those
inferences (e.g. in studies where a trait term serves as a useful
memory cue for other aspects of the person). However, this
approach has necessarily left open the question of whether
the perceivers spontaneously engage in the same deep
analysis of all behaviours or only those that intrinsically
convey diagnostic trait information. However, extant
research on the neural basis of social cognition now makes
it possible to circumvent the constraints of behavioural
methods through the use of neuroimaging. As discussed
above, tasks that require an explicit consideration of another
person’s transient or dispositional mental states—such as
forming an impression of another person—have been linked
to a specific pattern of brain activity that has consistently
implicated the medial frontal cortex in tasks that require
perceivers to infer the mental characteristics of others. The
ubiquity of medial frontal activation during such mentalizing
tasks over the last decade suggests that modulation in this
region can serve as a kind of neural indication that perceivers
have engaged in elaborative social-cognitive processing.
Accordingly, the presence or absence of increased medial
frontal activity between tasks can be used as a marker of
whether one task prompts greater social-cognitive processing
than another.
We capitalized on these neural observations to examine
the extent to which spontaneous social-cognitive processing
accompanies the presentation of nondiagnostic information
about a target. Participants in the current study were
presented with a series of unfamiliar target individuals, each
of whom was described by a series of trait-diagnostic and
trait-nondiagnostic statements. As in our previous work, for
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some targets, participants were instructed to use the
statements to form an impression of the target individual
(impression formation task); for other targets, participants
were instructed to encode the order in which statements
were paired with a particular individual (sequencing task). In
doing so, we asked two inter-related empirical questions.
First, do perceivers automatically attempt to leverage all
observed behaviours into inferences about a target or does
such spontaneous social-cognitive processing only accompany inherently trait-diagnostic behaviours? Second, does
the extent of social-cognitive processing of nondiagnostic
information depend on a perceiver’s goal when encountering
another person? That is, if perceivers do not engage in deep
social-cognitive processing of trait-nondiagnostic information in a spontaneous manner, can they do so more
deliberately when they have the explicit goal to make sense
of another person?
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 15 (11 female) right-handed, native
English speakers with no history of neurological problems
(mean age 19.6 years, range 18.4–22.9). Informed consent
was obtained in a manner approved by the Committee
for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth College.
Stimuli and behavioural procedure
Stimuli consisted of 360 statements that conveyed traitdiagnostic information about a person. Each of these
statements described an action that had previously been
normed to imply one of the 24 different personality traits
(15 statements per trait). Half the traits were positive, such
as considerate (‘he spent 2 hours showing his cousin how to
set up his personal computer’) and motivated (‘he turned
down three parties to study for organic chemistry’).
The remaining half of the traits were the negative aspect of
the same dimension, such as inconsiderate (‘he refused
to loan his extra blanket to the other campers’) and
lazy (‘he watched TV all day instead of looking for a job’).
The 12 different personality dimensions were motivated–
lazy, outgoing–introverted, funloving–boring, confident–
unconfident, considerate–inconsiderate, cultured–uncultured,
honest–dishonest, forgiving–unforgiving, cautious–reckless,
intelligent–unintelligent, responsible–irresponsible and generous–stingy. In addition, the stimulus set included 60 traitnondiagnostic statements that effectively conveyed no
information that could be used to form an impression of a
person. Examples of such trait-nondiagnostic statements
included ‘he bought a new set of highlighters’; ‘he spent the
Fourth of July at the beach’; ‘he opened his mail upon
getting home’ and ‘he photocopied the article’.
During scanning, statements were paired with 16 faces
(Caucasian males photographed against a blue background).

Diagnostic and nondiagnostic person information
Each trial consisted of a face-statement pair presented for
5500 ms. Each pair was accompanied by one of the two cues
(Form Impression, Remember Order) that indicated, respectively, whether the impression formation or sequencing task
was to be performed on that trial. In line with earlier
behavioural (Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Hamilton et al., 1980,
1989; Srull and Wyer, 1989; Wyer et al., 1984) and
neuroimaging (Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005) studies, for
impression formation trials, participants were instructed
to use the statement to generate an opinion about the
person or object. Participants were told that, for these trials,
their opinion about each target would later be measured.
For sequencing trials, participants were instructed to encode
the order in which statements were paired with each target.
Participants were told that, for these trials, their memory for
the sequences would later be tested. In actual fact, no such
tests were administered.
Functional scanning took place over two separate runs.
In each run, eight faces were each presented 15 times (60
impression formation and 60 sequencing trials). Across
presentations, a given face was consistently associated with
the same orienting task, although a different descriptive
statement accompanied each presentation of a face.
For each face, five trials were trait-diagnostic statements
that suggested a single positive personality trait (e.g.
considerate), five trials were trait-diagnostic statements
that suggested a single negative trait (e.g. inconsiderate)
and five trials were trait-nondiagnostic statements.
No significant differences were observed between positive
and negative statements and thus results were collapsed
across statement valence. To optimize estimation of the
event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) response, trials were intermixed in a pseudorandom
order and separated by a variable interstimulus interval
(500–9500 ms; Dale, 1999). During interstimulus intervals,
participants passively viewed a fixation crosshair.
Immediately prior to each functional run, participants
completed a brief practice session. Practice sessions comprised a random order of 20 impression formation and 20
sequencing trials, during which participants saw each of the
eight faces that were to be presented during the subsequent
run paired with five trait-diagnostic statements. These
statements implied one of the same traits that were later
associated with that same face. For example, if a face were
later to be described by statements that implied the traits
honesty and dishonesty, the five practice trials might all imply
honesty. Whether the practice trials converged on the
positive or negative trait was determined randomly, and
thus for another participant the five practice trials might all
imply dishonesty. No significant differences were observed
between statements that implied the same trait as the one
during practice and those that implied the opposite trait;
accordingly, all analyses are reported collapsed across
this factor.
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Imaging procedure
Imaging was conducted using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata
scanner. We first collected a high-resolution T1-weighted
structural scan (MP-RAGE) followed by two functional runs
of 440 volume acquisitions (25 axial slices; 5 mm thick;
1 mm skip). Functional scanning used a gradient-echo echoplanar pulse sequence (TR ¼ 2 s; TE ¼ 40 ms; 3.75  3.75
in-plane resolution). Stimuli were projected onto a screen at
the end of the magnet bore that participants viewed by way
of a mirror mounted on the head coil. Stimulus presentation
was controlled by PsyScope software (Cohen et al., 1993).
The fMRI data were preprocessed and analysed using
SPM99 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London, UK). First, functional data were time-corrected for
differences in acquisition time between slices for each wholebrain volume and realigned to correct for head movement.
Data were then transformed into a standard anatomical
space (3 mm isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM 152 brain
template (Montreal Neurological Institute), which approximates Talairach and Tournoux atlas space. Normalized data
were then spatially smoothed [8 mm full-width-at-halfmaximum (FWHM)] using a Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear
model in which the event-related design was modelled using
a canonical haemodynamic response function, its temporal
derivative and covariates of no interest (a session mean and a
linear trend). Comparisons of interest were implemented as
linear contrasts using a random-effects model. A voxel-based
statistical threshold of P < 0.005 was used for all comparisons; regions of interest (ROIs) were required to exceed 100
contiguous voxels in extent (providing an -level of P < 0.05,
corrected) for all contrasts. Statistical comparisons between
conditions were conducted using analysis of variance
(ANOVA) procedures on the parameter estimates associated
with each trial type.
RESULTS
Differences between orienting tasks
We first conducted a whole-brain, random-effects analysis
contrasting impression formation > sequencing, regardless of
statement diagnosticity. Replicating our earlier findings
(Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005), impression formation trials
were associated with reliably greater activation (compared
with sequencing trials) in a single location: dorsal mPFC
(Table 1). This region was distributed as a fairly extensive arc
(comprising 140 voxels) along the medial banks of the
superior frontal gyrus bilaterally. No other brain regions
were identified by this contrast.
Subsequently, we examined the pattern of responses across
all trials in this dorsal mPFC region. The parameter estimates
associated with each trial type were entered into a two-way
ANOVA. The pattern of activity in this region demonstrated
a significant main effect of statement diagnosticity,
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Table 1 Coordinates of peak activations and number of voxels for regions obtained from comparisons between orienting tasks (P < 0.05, corrected)
Anatomical label
Impression formation > sequencing
Dorsal mPFC
Sequencing > impression formation
Post-central gyrus
Superior frontal gyrus

X

Y

Z

Max. t

Voxels

12
12
9

24
39
33

63
51
60

6.10
5.65
4.85

140

51
57
27

45
48
3

54
42
54

5.72
5.29
4.41

156
119

A

Parameter estimate

Note: t-tests reflect the statistical difference between the two conditions, as computed by SPM99. Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute stereotaxic space.
For each region, a number of individual, local peak activations are reported along with the overall number of voxels in the region.
1.0
0.5
0.0
−0.5
−1.0
Impression formation

B

Parameter estimate

Diagnostic
1.0
0.5
0.0
−0.5
−1.0
Impression formation

Parameter estimate

Diagnostic

C

Sequencing
Nondiagnostic

Sequencing
Nondiagnostic

1.0
0.5
0.0
−0.5
−1.0
Impression formation
Diagnostic

Sequencing
Nondiagnostic

Fig. 1 An extensive region of dorsal mPFC was obtained from the contrast of impression formation > sequencing and is displayed on a sagittal (x ¼ 6) slice of subjects’ mean
normalized brain (Panel A). Analysis of the parameter estimates associated with trial types revealed main effects of both orienting task (impression formation vs sequencing) and
statement diagnosticity (diagnostic vs nondiagnostic), as well as a significant two-way interaction. Specifically, for trials encountered as part of the impression formation task (left
set of bars), no difference was observed between diagnostic and nondiagnostic statements. In contrast, for trials encountered as part of the sequencing task (right set of bars), a
significant effect of diagnosticity was observed. Qualitatively similar results were obtained in regions-of-interest defined in earlier research on the neural basis of impression
formation: Mitchell et al. (2004; Panel B) and Mitchell et al. (2005; Panel C).

F(1,14) ¼ 17.38, P < 0.001, such that greater overall activation was observed for trait-diagnostic than nondiagnostic
statements. Moreover, as displayed in Figure 1A, these main
effects were qualified by a significant two-way interaction of
orienting task and statement diagnosticity, F(1,14) ¼ 6.97,

P < 0.02, suggesting that the difference between impression
formation and sequencing varied as a function of statement
diagnosticity. Whereas the sequencing task was associated
with significantly greater activity for diagnostic
than nondiagnostic statements, t(14) ¼ 4.04, P < 0.002,
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Table 2 Coordinates of peak activations of regions obtained from the direct contrast of diagnostic > nondiagnostic statements (P < 0.05, corrected)
Anatomical label

X

Y

Z

Max. t

Voxels

Dorsal mPFC

12
3
9
51
60
51
54
57
60
18
15
21

36
48
36
15
6
12
42
54
12
99
96
102

57
48
54
27
30
30
0
21
18
6
9
9

4.87
4.75
4.53
5.03
4.60
4.13
8.13
6.58
5.95
8.08
7.85
7.53

155

Right STS
Left STSy
Occipital cortexy

133
618
558

y

Regions for which the additional activity associated with diagnostic statements corresponded to differences associated with statement length.

the impression formation task was associated with nearly
identical levels of activity for the two types of statements,
t(14) ¼ 0.21, P ¼ 0.84. Likewise, whereas the difference
between orienting tasks was highly significant for nondiagnostic statements, t(14) ¼ 4.40, P < 0.001, only a marginal
difference between impression formation and sequencing
was obtained for diagnostic statements, t(14) ¼ 1.92,
P < 0.08, two-tailed. Lastly, whereas impression formation
trials were associated with significant activation above
baseline regardless of diagnosticity (both P-values <0.005),
the sequencing task was associated with only a marginally
significant activation for diagnostic statements and
a marginally significant deactivation for nondiagnostic
statements (both P- values <0.07, two-tailed).1
To examine differences among trial types in the exact
regions previously associated with impression formation,
we also interrogated the same dorsal mPFC regions reported
in our earlier work (Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005). Qualitatively
similar effects were obtained in these regions, although the
effects were numerically weaker in the region obtained
in our first study than our second one. Specifically,
we observed significant main effects of both orienting task
and diagnosticity from the dorsal mPFC region defined from
our first study (Figure 1B; both P- values <0.02) as well as
the region defined from our second study (Figure 1C;
both P- values <0.01). However, the two-way interaction
of orienting task  diagnosticity reached statistical
significance only for the region defined from the second
study (P < 0.01).
The opposite contrast, sequencing > impression formation,
produced differences in post-central gyrus and superior
frontal gyrus (Table 1). These two regions corresponded
1 Although the dorsal mPFC region observed in the current study was generally associated with activations
above baseline, earlier work has observed deactivations in a very similar region (Mitchell et al., 2002).
Although impression formation was associated with similar activations above baseline in our earlier work
(Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005), little is currently understood about the conditions under which modulations in
the medial frontal cortex appear as activations vs deactivations (for an in-depth discussion of issues regarding
deactivations in medial frontal cortex, see Gusnard et al., 2001; Gusnard and Raichle, 2001).

closely (peak activations within a few voxels) to the
activations observed for the identical contrast in both of
our earlier studies (Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005).
Differences between trait-diagnostic and
nondiagnostic statements
We next examined the overall pattern of brain activation
during the processing of diagnostic social information by
contrasting diagnostic > nondiagnostic statements. This contrast revealed four regions of activation: dorsal mPFC; a
right-lateralized region that extended from the right STS to
the temporal pole; an extensive region along the entire length
of the left STS and bilateral occipital cortex (Table 2).
However, post-hoc analyses indicated that, on average,
trait-diagnostic statements were longer than trait-nondiagnostic statements (M ¼ 59.8 and 33.9 characters, respectively). To examine whether statement length accounted for
the activations in the four regions that were more engaged
for diagnostic than nondiagnostic statements, we conducted
two additional analyses. First, based on a median split, we
divided diagnostic statements into those that were relatively
long (M ¼ 73.0 characters) and relatively short (M ¼ 48.8
characters), and compared the response for these trial types
in all the four regions. A significant main effect of statement
length was observed in both left STS and occipital cortex
[both F(1,14) values >17.20, both P-values <0.001] but was
not observed in either dorsal mPFC or right STS/temporal
pole (both F values <0.30, both P-values >0.28). Second, to
identify regions that displayed a continuous relation between
statement length and BOLD signal, we included statement
length as a parametric modulator separately for both
diagnostic and nondiagnostic statements. The parameter
estimates associated with the modulator variable of statement length were significantly different from zero in both
left STS and occipital cortex (both P-values <0.01),
indicating that a significant linear relation existed between
BOLD response and statement length in these two regions.
No such relation was observed in either dorsal mPFC or
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right STS/temporal pole (both P-values > 0.80), confirming
the results of the median-split analysis and demonstrating
that activity in these regions was insensitive to the length of
statements.
Because this analysis suggested that the differences
between diagnostic and nondiagnostic statements in left
STS and occipital cortex were due to the greater length of
diagnostic statements, further analysis focused specifically
on the pattern of responses in dorsal mPFC and right STS/
temporal pole. A qualitatively similar pattern of results
was obtained in the dorsal mPFC region identified from
the contrast of diagnostic > nondiagnostic as for the one
obtained from the contrast of impression formation >
sequencing reported above, although the statistical reliability
of the differences among conditions was somewhat weaker in
the region when defined in this way.
A somewhat different pattern was observed in right STS/
temporal pole. Although ROI analyses revealed a significant
main effect of orienting task, F(1,14) ¼ 6.78, P < 0.03, the
two-way interaction of orienting task and diagnosticity failed
to reach significance in this region, F(1,14) ¼ 2.39, P ¼ 0.14.
Further analysis demonstrated that, unlike dorsal mPFC, the
difference between diagnostic and nondiagnostic statements
was significant both for sequencing trials, t(14) ¼ 4.51,
P < 0.0005, as well as impression formation trials,
t(14) ¼ 2.14, P < 0.05. However, like dorsal mPFC, the
difference between orienting tasks was significant for
nondiagnostic, t(14) ¼ 2.33, P < 0.04, but not diagnostic
statements, t(14) ¼ 0.92, P ¼ 0.37.
The reverse contrast of nondiagnostic > diagnostic revealed
activations in several brain regions that included bilateral
regions of parietal cortex comprising intraparietal sulcus and
angular gyrus, bilateral insula, left inferior frontal gyrus,
right middle frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate and a rightlateralized region of inferior occipital cortex.
DISCUSSION
The current study used functional neuroimaging to examine
the way in which perceivers spontaneously process person
information that fails to convey meaningful clues about the
nature of that person’s mind. We observed three main
findings. First, we replicated our earlier observations that an
extensive region of dorsal mPFC was differentially activated
when participants engaged in impression formation than
when they processed the same stimuli as part of a non-social
task (Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005). Second, overall activity in
dorsal mPFC and right STS/temporal pole was greater for
statements that conveyed trait-diagnostic information than
statements that were inherently trait-nondiagnostic.
Finally, further interrogation of the pattern of results in
dorsal mPFC suggested that when participants explicitly
attempted to form impressions of targets, activity in dorsal
mPFC did not significantly differentiate between diagnostic
and nondiagnostic statements. However, when participants
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were oriented away from the social-cognitive aspects of the
stimuli during the sequencing task, dorsal mPFC failed to
activate over baseline for nondiagnostic information and was
significantly less activated for nondiagnostic than for
diagnostic information. The interaction between orienting
task and statement diagnosticity suggests the twin observations that trait-nondiagnostic information is not subject to
spontaneous social-cognitive processing, but that such
processing may occur when perceivers have the explicit
goal to use that information to form an impression of a
target. This interpretation is consistent with earlier formulations regarding the spontaneous nature of trait inferences,
which have suggested that perceivers will automatically make
use of trait-diagnostic information about another person
(Winter et al., 1985; Uleman et al., 1996, 2005) and further
suggests that perceivers may need to be explicitly directed to
engage in deep social-cognitive processing when information
does not inherently imply such traits.
Although our earlier work on impression formation has
consistently observed differential activation in a single brain
region—dorsal mPFC—the results of the current study also
revealed modulation in the right STS extending into the
temporal pole. The STS region (including both the STS and
surrounding gyri) has previously been implicated in social
cognition through its activation in a wide range of
experimental situations that include the perception of
biological motion (for a review, see Allison et al., 2000).
These results have generally been interpreted to suggest that
the STS responds preferentially to the perception of meaningful social stimuli, especially those conveyed visually.
Consistent with this notion, trait-diagnostic statements also
convey uniquely useful information about the mind of
another person (like meaningful hand movements or shifts
in eye gaze), whereas trait-nondiagnostic statements provide
little basis for such social inferences. Interestingly, although
the STS has typically been linked most strongly to visual
perception of social behaviour, the current results suggest
that the contributions of this area may extend to situations
in which social meaning is implied through verbal stimuli.
Interestingly, Harris et al. (2005) have recently observed a
similar dissociation in a more posterior region of STS, which
was preferentially engaged when participants read information that conveyed the idiosyncratic (and hence, socially
diagnostic) aspects of another person’s personality.
Greater activation for diagnostic than nondiagnostic
information extended from STS into the temporal poles, a
region previously identified with social-cognitive processing.
Although the nature of the contributions made by temporal
poles to social cognition remain somewhat mysterious, some
researchers have suggested that this region plays an
important role in accessing knowledge in the form of
schemas and scripts (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). That this
region was preferentially engaged in the current study by
diagnostic information is highly consistent with this view of

Diagnostic and nondiagnostic person information
temporal pole activity; indeed, the very reason that some
statements convey trait-diagnostic information must be that
they activate a pre-defined schema that communicates the
social meaning of particular behaviours.
We note that what has been designated here as
‘nondiagnostic’ social information may not always fail to
provide diagnostic clues about another person’s mind.
Situated in an appropriate context, even the most mundane
actions may reveal important aspects of another’s mental
states. For example, learning that someone ‘opened his mail
upon getting home’ may not, in and of itself, communicate
much about either his mental states or his dispositional
traits, unless one also knows that the individual has been
awaiting a letter about medical school admissions. In other
words, having an appropriate contextual backdrop may
imbue otherwise nondiagnostic information with important
social-cognitive meaning. Whether the ability for context to
alter the diagnostic value of person information is reflected
in changes in the brain regions we have reported here—in
particular, dorsal mPFC and right STS/temporal pole—poses
an interesting empirical question for future research.
Lastly, we highlight the value of having adopted a
functional neuroimaging approach to a question that,
although of theoretical interest within social psychology,
could not easily be addressed using traditional behavioural
measures. In suggesting that the nondiagnostic person
information can be subjected to the same depth of
processing as highly diagnostic information—but only
when perceivers have adopted the explicit goal of forming
impressions of another person—this study helps establish
the limits to the spontaneity of our social inferences without
the need to rely on behavioural indices of such processing
(which has been particularly difficult for nondiagnostic
information). We are especially heartened by the fact that
research into the neural basis of social cognition has now
progressed to the point where extant neuroimaging findings
can be used both to formulate specific hypotheses of
psychological interest and, in turn, to provide a useful
means for subjecting such hypotheses to empirical inquiry.
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